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ON THE FAILURE OF CORE CONVERGENCE IN ECONOMIES 

WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 

1. INTRODUCTION 
THE AIM  OF  THIS  PAPER  is  to study  core convergence  in  economies with  asymmetric 
information.  We will  argue that  the  positive  results  of  Debreu  and Scarf  (1963)  and 
Aumann (1964) do not extend to a model with incomplete information in which decisions 
are made at the interim stage.2 
Consider first the case in which  decisions  are made at the ex-ante stage, i.e., before 
information is revealed to any agent. A well-known price equilibrium concept for such a 
model  is  the  notion  of  an  Arrow-Debreu  equilibrium  in  (complete)  markets  with 
contingent commodities. The fact that in such markets an Arrow-Debreu  equilibrium is 
identical to a Walrasian equilibrium with an appropriate indexing of commodities by time 
and state immediately implies the standard relationship between such allocations  and a 
corresponding notion of  the ex-ante core: (a) Arrow-Debreu allocations belong to the 
ex-ante core, and (b) the Debreu-Scarf  argument can be applied (with no more than a 
reinterpretation) to assert that any ex-ante core allocation that survives replication is an 
Arrow-Debreu allocation. 
While the Arrow-Debreu model involves incomplete information, it is essentially one 
of  symmetric  uncertainty.  Asymmetry  of  information  can  be  incorporated  into  this 
ex-ante framework by postulating that consumers differ in their ex-post information. One 
such approach is  the one introduced by  Radner (1968), which imposes the requirement 
that an agent's trades be measurable with respect to her private information. Equilibrium 
allocations so defined (Radner allocations) bear the standard relationship with an ex-ante 
core concept that similarly imposes such measurability restrictions (as in Allen (1991) and 
Yannelis (1991)); see Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001). Another approach for dealing 
with ex-post asymmetry of information (based on mechanism design) is to directly impose 
incentive compatibility on agents' trades. A corresponding price equilibrium notion is the 
one used in Prescott and Townsend (1984). Here, even in the ex-ante case, matters are no 
longer so simple. As Forges, Heifetz, and Minelli (2001) show, core equivalence does not 
generally hold, although a positive result can be established under certain conditions. 
We shall concentrate on the interim stage, i.e., the stage when agents have received 
their private information. In this context, too, the existing  literature (Goenka and Shell 
(19971, Kobayashi  (19801,  and Yannelis  (1991))  seems  to  point  to the validity  of  the 
convergence principle. However, we will begin by showing that the coarse core of Wilson 
(1978) does not converge to any  set of  price equilibrium allocations considered in  the 
literature. To prove our main point we construct a simple example of  a replicated sunspot 
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economy with strictly convex and monotonic  preference^.^  Thus, even when uncertainty 
does not affect the fundamentals of  the economy, core convergence fails. The underlying 
reason for our negative results can be traced to an important implication of  cooperation 
in the presence of  asymmetric information. Suppose there are two states of the world, s 
and  t, and  two  agents,  one is  informed  and the  other  is  uninformed.  A  coalitional 
improvement will typically  require (for the usual  reasons  related  to adverse selection) 
that  the  informed  consumer  be  made  better-off  in  both  states  of  the  world.  This 
translates into a restriction on allowable coalitions, which, as we shall see, can be enough 
for a failure of  the standard Debreu-Scarf  argument. Finally, we demonstrate that the 
failure  of  core convergence  is  robust  to many  reasonable  modifications  of  either the 
(interim) core or the (interim) price equilibrium concept. 
2. AN  INTERIM  ECONOMY  WITH  ASYMMETRIC  INFORMATION 
Consider an exchange economy with a finite set of  consumers, N, and a finite set of 
states of  the world, 0.There are a finite number of  commodities, and the consumption 
set  of  each  consumer  is  R!+  in  each  state. A  consumption  plan  of  consumer  i  is  a 
function  xi : 0- [Wi  . Let  Xi denote the set of  all consumption plans for consumer  i. 
For A c f2,Xi(A) denotes the set of  all  xi(A)  = (x,(w)), , A  where xi(w) E  IW:  for all 
w EA.The endowment  of  i  is  denoted  ei EX;. Consumer  i  has  a  Bernoulli  utility 
function ui :IW:  x 0- R; for a consumption plan xi, ui(xi(w), o)  denotes the utility of  i 
in state  o. We shall  assume that for  all  i E N  and  all  w E f2, ui(., w)  is  continuous, 
monotonic, and concave. 
The private information of  consumer  i is represented by pi,  a partition  of  0.For a 
state o E f2,let gi(  W)  be the element of githat contains  o.  Thus, when the state is  w, 
consumer i knows that the true state lies in ~~(o).~  Each consumer i is assumed to have 
a probability measure pi on f2 that represents i's prior beliefs regarding the states. We 
assume that for each  A EL?;,  P~(A) > 0. For  w E f2 we  denote by  pj(o  I  pi(w)>,  the 
conditional probability assigned by consumer  i to state w. For a consumption plan xi and 
A EL?;,  consumer i's conditional expected utility is denoted q(xi  IA), where 
Consumer i  prefers consumption plan  xi to consumption plan  yi at state  w whenever 
q(xi  19;(ow>>  > Y(yi lPi(w)>. 
An economy is defined as g=(0, N,(9i,~i,ei,~i)rE1\1). 
An  allocation for an economy is (xi);, , E niXi such that 
x x,(w) =  ei(w)  for all  w E f2. 
ieN  ieN 
'The example we construct for this purpose also shows that core equivalence need not hold in an 
economy  with  an  atomless  measure  space  of  consumers.  This  refutes  the  conjecture  on core 
equivalence in Kobayashi (1980, page 1647). We also refute (in Section 4) the conjecture in Yannelis 
(1991, Remark 6.5). 
This formulation  is  equivalent  to one in  which  the private  information  of  each consumer is 
described by  the consumer's  type  and an information  state for the economy refers  to a profile of 
consumers'  types.  In  particular,  each  element  of  the partition  refers  to a  particular  type  of  L?'! 
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Thus an allocation can be viewed  as a state-contingent contract that is feasible  in each 
state. Let dNdenote the set of allocations. A coalition S  is a nonempty subset of  N. An 
allocation x  is said to be feasible for coalition S  if 
xxi(w)=  xe,(w)  forall  w~fl. 
i€S  i € S 
Let st'' denote the set of allocations feasible for S. 
Coalition formation in our model takes place at the interim stage. More precisely, if 
the true state is  w, each consumer observes the event Pi(@) and at this stage consumers 
may form coalitions and agree to an allocation that is feasible for the coalition. We shall 
assume that when a contract has to be enforced, the true state is publicly verifiable. This 
obviates the need for imposing incentive  compatibility  constraints  on allowable  alloca- 
tions.  Our main results continue to hold even without this  simplifying  assumption; see 
Section 4 below. A notion of the core suitable for the present context is the coarse core 
of  Wilson  (1978), which  is based  on the idea that  a coalition, in  designing  a potential 
objection, can only consider those events that are commonly known to consumers in the 
coalition. To describe such events we need some additional notation. Let (Pi)i it  be an 
information structure for S. The meet of  the partitions (Pi)ii,, is the finest partition of 
fl  that is coarser than each Pi,  i E S,  and it is denoted by Ps= Ai,  PL. An event E is 
said to be common knowledge among the members of S at w  if  Ps(w)  cE. We can now 
say that coalition S  has an objection to allocation x if  there is another allocation  y  €dS, 
and a state w E  fl  at which it is common knowledge among the members of  S  that each 
i E S prefers  yi  to xi. Equivalently,  coalition S  is said to have  a  coarse objection to an 
allocation  x edNif  there exists  y edSand an event E ~9' such that 
q(y,  IA) > q(xi  1A) for all  i ES,  for all  A €Pi such that  A cE. 
The  coarse  core  is  the  set  of  all  x €dN to which  there  does  not  exist  a  coarse 
objection. 
An  allocation  x €dN is  said  to be  interim  efjicient  if  N  does not  have  a  coarse 
objection to x. Similarly, x €dS is said to be interim efjicient for  S  if  S  does not have a 
coarse objection to x. 
Our first aim is to study the relationship between the coarse core and a corresponding 
price equilibrium notion as  an economy is  replicated.  Clearly, any such  exercise  must 
involve a price equilibrium concept that captures decision making at the interim stage.5 
Moreover, for the present exercise it is reasonable to consider a price equilibrium notion 
such that the corresponding  allocations  belong to the coarse  core. We now turn to a 
definition of  such equilibrium notion. 
While Wilson (1978)established the nonemptiness of the coarse core by constructing a 
corresponding NTU game and proving it  to be balanced,  he also pointed  out (Wilson 
(1978, footnote 6)) that  an alternative  proof  consists  of  showing that the coarse  core 
contains  a  constrained  market  equilibrium  allocation.  Let  p =(p(w)),, ,denote  a 
vector of  state-contingent market prices where p( w)  E  iW'  for w E  fl. Let  A denote the 
unit  simplex  in  [W'~I"I.  For  consumer  i  and  A €Pi, the  budget  set  of  consumer  i 
It is easy to see that the ex-ante core bears no logical relationship  to the coarse core since the 
latter  is based  on  interim considerations; see Vohra (1999) for  examples. There is, therefore, no 
hope  of  establishing  a  core  convergence/equivalence  result  for  the  coarse  core  and  ex-ante 
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corresponding to the event A,  given a price vector p  E A, is denoted 
A constrained market eq~iilibrium  is defined as (x,  p) EH' X A such that for every i E N 
and A ~9,, 
xi(  A)  E 	arg max q(. 1 A) .6 
Y,(PA) 
Our negative result applies to any price equilibrium concept that satisfies the following 
natural property: if  agent i knows state w, then i must maximize u,(.,  w)  given the prices 
prevailing in state w. 
PROPERTY  P:  Suppose (x, p) is an eq~iilibri~im  and there exist  w E 0 and a consumer i 
such that {w)  €9,. Then 




Clearly, Property  P  is  satisfied by  a  constrained  market equilibrium. As we will see 
below, it is also satisfied by several other price equilibrium notions. 
Since we  will  be  dealing with  replica economies, we  need  some additional, related 
definitions. Given an economy 8=  u,,  e,, pi),  x EH~, (0, N,(pi,  ), and an allocation 
replicas  of  2?  and  x  are  defined  as  follows.  For  every  positive  integer  nz,  let 
I,  = {1,2,.. .,m).  The  rnth  replica  of  2?  is  the  economy  8"' = (0,  N  X I,,,, 
(9(i,  jl,qi, 	 N X  g(i, j) =gj,  qi, j) = uj, j),qi,  j), p(;, j))(j,  j)E NxI,,, ), where for all  (i,  j) 
e(,, j) = e,, and  ,a(,, j, = ,ui.The rnth  replica  of  x  is  denoted  x"'  where  x:y  =xi for  all 
(i,  j) EN  x I,,,.'  Note that the set of information states does not change with replication. 
This is different from the replication process of Gul and Postlewaite (1992)which is used 
by  Forges, Heifetz, and Minelli (2001).The important consequence of  this difference is 
that in our formulation replication results in information becoming nonexclusive, which 
in turn makes incentive  constraints redundant. The fact that this is not so in the other 
formulation is critical for the Forges, Heifetz, and Minelli (2001)result on the failure of 
convergence of  the ex-ante incentive compatible core. 
3.  FAILURE  OF  CORE  CONVERGENCE:  AN  EXAMPLE 
Our main results are negative. The fact that we will derive them from examples of very 
simple economies makes them all the more compelling. Indeed, throughout this section, 
we shall consider economies in which uncertainty is extrinsic to the fundamentals of  the 
economy. We consider  sunspot  economies  consisting  of  two  states  and  two  kinds  of 
consumers-those  who are fully  informed  and those who  cannot  distinguish  between 
either state at the interim stage. The economy can then be seen as a restricted market 
participation  economy  of  Cass  and  Shell  (1983) in  which  informed  consumers  can 
participate  only in spot markets. For our purposes then, an economy 8 is said to be a 
sunspot economy if  0= {s,  t),  N =Nl U  N,,  Pi= (0) for all i E Nl and 9,= ({s),  {t))  for 
While there is  some abuse of  notation in the use of  q(. A)  above, this should not cause any 
confusion since Q(xi I A)  actually depends only on xi(A).
'We shall sometimes find it convenient  to refer to consumer (i,j)  EN  X I,,,as consumer 0. CORE  CONVERGENCE  1689 
all i EN,,  and for all i EN,  ~i~(., S) = ui(., t) and ei(s) =e,(t). Note that for a coalition S 
such that S nN, + 0,the only common knowledge event is {s,t), whereas for a coalition 
S such that S  Nl = 0,there are two common knowledge events, {s) and {t). 
In a  sunspot  economy, the definition  of  a  sunspot  eq~iilib~ium (see  Cass  and  Shell 
(1983)) corresponds exactly  to the definition  of  a  constrained  market equilibrium, and 
therefore satisfies property P. In particular, informed consumers maximize ex-post utility 
subject  to their  ex-post  budget  constraint,  while  uninformed  consumers  maximize  ex-
pected utility subject to a single budget constraint (involving contingent commodities). 
Consider  the  following  example of  a  two-consumer, restricted  market  participation 
economy. 
N = {1,21, n = {s, t). 
9, = ((3, t)) and 9, = ({s),{t)). 
u,((a,  b), w) = (ab)lI4 for i = 1,2  and for w = s,  t. 
el(s) = el(t) = (0,24) and e2(s)= e,(t)  = (24,O). .p,,(s) = p,,(t) = $, for i = 1,2. 
This simple sunspot economy has a unique sunspot equilibrium, (i,  j?),  where 
Thus, the unique equilibrium is actually sunspot-pee, in the sense that for each consumer 
i, i,(s)  =i,(t). Clearly, for any integer m, (in',j?)  is the unique price equilibrium in 8"'. 
Of course, Z  belongs to the coarse core (Wilson (1978, footnote 6)). 
CLAIM 1:  Let 8  be the economy defined in Example 1 and x be the allocntiorz: 
The mth replication of  x is in the coarse core of  8"' for all m but x cannot be suppo~,ted as 
an equiliblz'urn sntisfjiingproper9 P. 
PROOF:Clearly, x cannot be supported by  an equilibrium satisfying Property P, since 
the  equilibrium relative  price in each state must be  1, and the informed  consumer  in 
state t  is then trading below his budget line. 
Suppose there exists  m  such  that  x"'  does not belong  to the coarse  core of  8"'. 
Suppose coalition S  has a coarse objection y  to x"'.  It is easy to see that x"'  is interim 
individually  rational.  This  implies  that  S must  contain  both  kinds  of  consumers 
(uninformed and informed). Let k, and k, be the number of uninformed and informed 
consumers  in  S, respectively.  It can  be  shown  that  there  is  no  loss  of  generality  in 
assuming that y  satisfies equal treatment and is interim efficient for coalition S. Let y, 
denote the consumption  plan  of  each uninformed  consumer  and  y,  the  consumption 
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The aggregate endowment of  coalition  S in each state is 
By  ex-post  efficiency  of  y  (for  coalition  S), it  follows  that  the  marginal  rate  of 
substitution  of  each  consumer  in  state  w =s, t  must  be  the  same.  Since  the  utility 
functions are Cobb-Douglas, this implies that there exist constants  a,,El  E(0,l)such that: 
(i)  in  state  s,  the  total  amount  of  each  commodity,  allocated  to  the  uninformed 
consumers is the fraction  a  of  coalition  S's  aggregate endowment of  that  commodity, 
and the remainder, namely the fraction (1- a)  is allocated to the informed consumers; 
and (ii) in state t,  the same is true with fractions  p  and (1- p).  Thus, the consumption 
plan  of  each  uninformed  consumer is  (a/kl)es in  state  s  and ( P/k,)es  in  state  t. 
Similarly, the consumption plan of  each informed consumer is ((1- a)/k2)es in state s 






Letting  z = k2/kl,the above equation can now be rewritten as: 
Using (2)and (3), this yields: 
(6)  [ul(yl(s)>12 < 246  - 152 
and 
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Taking square roots on both sides of (6) and (7), and using (I), we have 
(8)  g,(z) +g,(z) > 7. 

To complete the proof the reader must show that (8) cannot hold. To do this, notice that 

the  functions  g,(.)  and  g,(.)  are  both  differentiable  and  concave  in  z.  Moreover 

g,(l) +g,(l) = 7. It then suffices to show that the derivative of  g,(z) +g,(z) is 0 at z = 1, 

which can be easily done. 
This completes the proof that x"'  belongs to the coarse core of 8"' for any in. Q.E.D. 
Notice that the argument we have used for showing that x"'  does not belong to the 
coarse core of  evely replicated economy also applies (with obvious modifications) to an 
economy with an atomless measure space of consumers. In an economy in which half the 
consumers  have  the characteristics  of  consumer  1 and half  have  the characteristics of 
consumer 2 in Example 1, x  belongs to the core where x, and x, denote the consump- 
tion of  all consumers of each of  the two kinds. 
Recall that in any replication of  the economy of  Example 1 there are several agents 
who are completely informed. In particular, no single agent possesses information that is 
not available elsewhere in the economy. Replication therefore ensures that information 
is  nonexclusive  in the sense  of  Postlewaite  and Schmeidler (19861, and agents  in  our 
model  are,  therefore,  informationally  (arbitrarily)  small  according  to  the  definition 
introduced in McLean and Postlewaite (1999). 
The proof  of  Claim  1 is  instructive  in  that  it  shows why the standard Debreu-Scarf 
argument does not apply to the coarse core. A coarse objection for a coalition consisting 
of  informed as well  as uninformed  consumers must provide for an improvement in the 
expected utility of the uninformed, and in the interim (in the present case, ex-post) utility 
of  both  "typesn8 of  the  informed  consumers.  This  requirement  is  necessary  for  the 
potential objection to be common knowledge among all members of the coalition. As in 
Goenka and Shell (1997), one can transform the restricted participation economy into a 
quasi-Walrasian  economy  in  which  an  informed  consumer  is  transformed  into  two 
consumers, one for each state of the world. Thus an informed consumer of  "type"  s  has 
endowment only in state s and consumes only in state s. In terms of  the quasi-Walrasian 
economy, the common knowledge requirement of  a coarse objection means that allow- 
able coalitions are restricted to have the same number of informed consumers of type s 
as  of  type  t. It is  this  restriction  that  accounts for the  nonconvergence  phenomenon. 
Without such a restriction the usual Debreu-Scarf argument, applied to quasi-Walrasian 
consumers, does yield  "convergence."  However, the  corresponding  notion  of  the  core 
with quasi-Walrasian consumers does not have  any natural interpretation in terms of  a 
core with  asymmetric information; see, for example, the discussion in Vohra (1999). 
There is one particular case in which  the core of  the economy with quasi-Walrasian 
consumers coincides with  the coarse core, and this provides  us with  a positive conver- 
gence result, at least for certain core allocations. As the next claim shows, in economies 
such as the one in Example 1,convergence does indeed hold if  one restricts  attention to 
those allocations in the coarse core that are sunspot-free. (Recall that the core allocation 
considered in Claim 1is  not  sunspot-free.) 
CLAIM2:  Let 8 be  a sunspot economy, and suppose that the core convergence theorem 
holds at the ex-post stage. If  x is sunspot-pee and x"'  belongs to the coarse core of  8"' for 
euely nz, then x is a sunspot equilibrium allocation. 
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PROOF: Suppose not, i.e., suppose x  is a sunspot-free allocation such that x"'  belongs 
to the coarse core of 8"'for every rn but x  is not a sunspot equilibrium allocation. Since 
x  is sunspot-free, this must mean that in any state w, the projection of  x onto that state, 
x(w), is not a Walrasian allocation  of  the ex-post economy. Since the core convergence 
theorem  holds  at  the  ex-post  stage,  there  exists  a  replica  of  size  rn of  the  ex-post 
economy in state w  and a coalition S(w)  of agents improving upon xn'(w).Because the 
allocation  x  is  sunspot-free, the same is  true in  every  w, where the same coalition of 
ex-post consumers is  an improving coalition. Therefore, there exists  a coarse  improve- 
ment upon  xu': letting  S(w)  = S1 U s,(~), the types in the coarsely improving coalition 
are Sl u  U, , a  S2(w)and the coarse improvement is the allocation that uses the ex-post 
objection in each state.  Q.E.D. 
We end this section by noting the implications of  interim informational considerations 
on the equal-treatment property,  an important ingredient  of  the Debreu-Scarf  conver-
gence argument. It is easy to see that a sunspot-free  allocation  in the coarse core of  a 
sunspot  economy satisfies the equal treatment  property  if  utility  functions  are strictly 
concave. In general, however, the coarse core need not satisfy equal treatment. Indeed, it 
can be checked that in  a replica  of  size  2 of  the economy of  Example  1 the following 
allocation, y, belongs to the coarse core. 
4. ROBUSTNESS 
4.1.  Modijications of the Coarse Core 
In this subsection we shall consider several modifications of  the coarse core, already 
suggested in the literat~re,~  and show that our results in the previous section are robust 
to each of  these. 
A model in which  private  information  is  not publicly  revealed  even  after  exchange 
takes place motivates the introduction of  incentive  compatibility constraints. Analogous 
to the efficiency  notions  incorporating  incentive  compatibility,  as introduced in Holm- 
strom and Myerson (19831, one can consider  a  corresponding notion of  the  incentive 
compatible coarse core, as in Vohra (1999). Recall that in our model replication renders 
information  nonexclusive  in  the  sense of  Postlewaite  and  Schmeidler  (1986). It then 
follows from Proposition 3.1 in Vohra (1999) that in every replication of the economy, the 
allocation  x'"  constructed  in the proof  of  Claim  1 belongs  to the incentive  compatible 
core of 8"', for rn > 1. Thus, in the economy of Example 1, the incentive compatible core 
does not converge to the equilibrium allocation (which is also incentive compatible). 
Refinements of the coarse core, which allow for some pooling of private information, 
such  as  the  coarse +core  introduced  by  Lee  and  Volij  (1997)"  and  the  core  with 
endogenous communication of Volij (20001, do not help in terms of  convergence either. 
In fact, it can be shown that for every replication  rn,  the allocation  x"'  constructed in the 
proof of  Claim 1 belongs to these cores of 8"'. 
%ee  Forges (1998) and Forges, Minelli, and Vohra (2000) for a survey. 

lo See also Lee (1998). 
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Going further in the direction of sharing information, one can consider arbitrary forms 
of  information pooling, corresponding to Wilson's  (1978) fine core. As Wilson  showed, 
the fine core may be empty. For this reason alone, the fine core does not converge to a 
price allocation. 
The model in Goenka and Shell (1997) can be viewed as one of  asymmetric informa- 
tion.  In their  Definition  5.6, the authors consider  a variant  of  the  coarse  core where 
objections  are  defined  without  reference  to  a  common  knowledge  event."  For  our 
purposes, it will be enough to concentrate on sunspot economies as defined in Section 3. 
In particular,  f2= {s,  t) and the randomizing device is based on the u-algebra generated 
by the fine partition ({s), {t)). In this setting, the essential difference''  between their core 
notion  and the coarse core concerns  only  the case in which  an objecting coalition, S, 
contains  no  uninformed  consumers.  In  such  a  case,  they  require  all  the  (informed) 
members  of  S  to be better-off  in  both  states.  In  contrast,  recall  that  for  a  coarse 
objection from S (containing no uninformed  consumers) it  suffices  that  there is  some 
state in which  all its members are better-off. Therefore, their  core contains the coarse 
core, and the conclusions of  Claim 1,as well as the final paragraph of Section 3 extend to 
it. In light of  these  remarks, Lemma 7.1 and Theorem 7.3 in  Goenka and Shell (1997) 
should be seen as applying to the core of  an economy with quasi-Walrasian consumers 
rather than to a notion of  the core in asymmetric information economies.'" 
4.2.  Other Notions of  Price Equilibria 
Claim  1 applies to any price  equilibrium notion satisfying  Property  P.14 As we have 
already observed, constrained market equilibria and sunspot equilibria satisfy this prop- 
erty. So do Radner equilibria and rational expectations equilibria of an economy in which 
trade takes place only in spot markets. It is  easy to see that these equilibrium concepts 
also yield Z as the unique equilibrium allocation in the economy described in Example 1. 
One may  also  consider  Radner  equilibria  or  rational  expectations  equilibria  in  an 
economy  in  which  trade,  at  the  interim  stage,  is  in  contingent  commodities. In  the 
economy  described  in  Example  1, this  means  that  four  contingent  commodities  are 
traded  at the  interim  stage. Since the informed  consumers  trade  after  receiving  their 
signal, the market prices for these four commodities, in general, depend on the signal 
received  by  the informed.  Let  ps= (ps(s),p"t))  denote the market  prices  when  the 
signal received by  the informed consumer is s. Similarly, let pi  denote the market prices 
when the signal received by  the informed consumer is  t. Since informed consumers are 
allowed to trade in contingent commodities, in general, it  is possible that Property P is 
not satisfied in equilibrium. However, it can be shown that in the economy of Example 1, 
these  equilibria do satisfy  Property  P. It is  easy to see that the equilibrium prices  are 
I I Note that for the particular  case of  sunspot economies, the core (in the pooling case) used in 
Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) is the same as the one in Definition 5.6 of  Goenka and Shell (1997). 
l2 There are two other differences:  (i) They require allocations  to be measurable with respect to 
the  u-algebra used for defining randomizing devices. However, this measurability  restriction is void 
if  one considers, as we do, the fine u-algebra. (ii) They define objections using weak inequalities (and 
some strict inequality), but this does not affect our arguments. 
13 We thank Karl Shell for clarifying this point. 
14 Also  implicit  in  our  argument  is  the  linearity  of  the  price  functional.  The  possibility  of 
examining  this  issue  in  the context  of  nonlinear  prices,  as  in  Bisin and  Gottardi (2000), remains 
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ps(s) = (1/2,1/2),  ps(t) = (0,O) and pl(s) = (0, O),  pl(t) = (1/2,1/2).  A ratiollal expecta-
tions equilibrium, therefore, results  in both consumers consuming (12,12) in each state. 
(There is no llollrevealing rational expectations equilibrium.) Since this allocation is the 
same in both states, it is also the unique outcome of  a Radner equilibrium. 
4.3.  Measurability Considerations 
A skeptical reader may still wonder whether nonconvergence can be shown for a core 
allocation that is measurable with respect to the private information of  the uninformed 
consumers.  In Example  1, this  measurability  restriction  is  the same  as requiring  the 
coarse allocation to be sunspot-free. And as we have seen in Claim 2, it was critical for 
the proof of Claim 1that x was not sunspot-free. However, we now show, by collsiderillg 
an economy that is not a sunspot economy, that measurability restrictiolls are not enough 
to restore core convergence.  Specifically, we construct a non-sunspot economy in which 
there exists  an allocation, x, which  is  constant  across  states such  that  its replication 
belongs to the coarse core in the corresponding replicated economy and x is not a price 
equilibrium  allocation.  This  allocation  also  belongs  to  the  core  studied  in  Yannelis 
(19911.'~ 
.n= {s,t), N = 11,2). 
9,= ({s, t))  and 9,= (Is), It)). 
u,((a, b), s) = ~z'/~b"/",u2((a,b), s) = 2a1/4b3/4,and .,((a,  b), t) =~"/"b'/~ for  i = 
I,  L. 
el(s>=el(t)  = (0,241 and e,(s) = e2(t)= (24,O). 
,uJ0 = ,u,(t) = +,i = 1,2. 
Consider the following allocation  x: 
It is easy to check that in an economy with spot markets there is a unique, fully revealing 
rational  expectations equilibrium16with prices  p(s) = (1/4,3/4)  and p(t) = (3/4,1/4). 
The corresponding allocation is  2,  where 
It can  also be shown, as in the previous  subsection, that  in  a  market with  contingent 
commodities, 2 is the unique allocation corresponding to a rational expectations equilib-
rium. While  2  is  not  the allocation corresponding to a  Radner equilibrium (with spot 
markets or with contingent commodity markets), it  can, nevertheless, be shown that in 
either case the equilibrium allocation  is not x. 
15 In this core notion, allocations  are required to be measurable with respect to each consumer's 
private  information  and, as  in  Goenka  and  Shell  (1997) and  Ichiishi  and  Idzik (19961,  informed 
consumers in an objecting coalition must be made better-off in each state. 
This is  also the unique constrained market equilibrium. CORE  CONVERGENCE  1695 
We will now show that  x'"  belongs to the coarse core of every replica g"'. We argue 
by  contradiction. Suppose there is  a  replica 8"' such that  x'"  does not belong to its 
Coarse Core and let  S  be a  coalition that improves upon  x"'.  Let  k,  and k, be the 
number of  uninformed and informed consumers in  S, respectively. Following the same 
steps as in the proof of  Claim 1, and letting z = lc,/k,,  one arrives at the inequality 
To complete the proof we must show that this inequality cannot hold. To do this, notice 
that the function on the left-hand side is differentiable and concave in  z. Moreover the 
left-hand  side  equals  the  right-hand  side  when  z = 1. In  fact,  the  function  on the 
left-hand  side  reaches  a  maximum  at  z= 1, and  can,  therefore,  never  exceed  the 
right-hand side. Therefore, xn' belongs to the coarse core of  g"'for any nz. 
Dept.  of  Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman St., Providence, RI 02912,  U.S.A.; 
roberto-serrano@brown.edu; http://  econ.pstc.  brown.  edu /faculty /serano; 
Dept.  of Economics, Brown  University, 64 Waterman St., Providence, RI 02912,  U.S.A.; 
rajiv-vohra @brown.  edu; http: // econ.pstc.  brown.edu / -rvohra, 
and 
Dept.  of  Economics,  Iowa  State  University, Ames,  LA  50011,  U.S.A.,  and  Dept.  of 
Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91  905 Israel; oscar@volij.  co.  il; http: //  volij.  co.  il 
Manuscript received January, 2000; final  revision received Augut, 2000 
REFERENCES 
ALLEN,B.  (1991):  "Market  Games  with  Asymmetric  Information  and  Nontransferable  Utility: 
Representation  Results  and  the  Core,"  CARESS  Working  Paper  No.  91-09,  University  of 
Pennsylvania. 
ANDERSON, R. M. (1992): "The  Core in Perfectly  Competitive Economies,"  in  Handbook of  Game 
Theory with Economic Applications (Vol. I),  ed. by  R. J. Aumann and S. Hart. Amsterdam: North 
Holland, Ch. 14. 
ANDERSON, R. M., AND W. ZAME  (1997): "Edgeworth's  Conjecture with Infinitely Many Con~modi- 
ties: L',"  Econometrica, 65, 225-273. 
ANDERSON, R. M., W. TROCIEL,  AND  L. ZHOU  (1997): "Non-Convergence  of  the  Mas-Cole11 and 
Zhou Bargaining Sets," Econometrica, 65, 1227-1240. 
AUMANN, R. J. (1964): "Markets with a Continuum of  Traders," Econometrica, 32, 39-50. 
----- (1987): "Game Theoly," in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, ed. by  J. Eatwell, M. 
Milgate, and P. Newman. New York: Norton. 
BISIN,  A,, AND P. GOTTARDI  (2000): "Decentralizing  Incentive Efficient  Allocations of  Economies 
with Adverse Selection," Mimeo. 
CASS,  D., AND K. SHELL  (1983): "Do Sunspots Matter?"  Jo~lrnal  of  Political Economy, 91, 193-227. 
DEBREU,  G., AND H. SCARF  (1963): "A Limit Theorem on the Core of  an Economy," Irztenzatiorzal 
Economic Review, 4, 235-246. 
EINY,  E., D. MORENO,  AND  B.  SHITOVITZ  (2001):  "Competitive  and  Core Allocations  in  Large 
Economies with Differential Information," Economic Theory, 18, 321-332. 
FORGES,  F. (1998): "Le  Coeur d'une Economie d'Echange  en Information  Asymetrique,"  Working 
Paper 98-29, THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise. 
FORGES,  F., A.  HEIFETZ,  AND  E. MINELLI  (2001): "Incentive  Compatible  Core  and  Competitive 
Equilibria in Differential Information Economies," Economic Theory, 18, 349-365. 1696  R.  SERRANO,  R.  VOHRA,  AND  O.  VOLIJ 
FORGES, F., E. MINELLI, AND R. VOHRA  (2000): "Incentives  and the Core of  an Exchange Economy: 
A Survey," Jo~lrnal  of Mathematical Ecorzomics, forthcoming. 
GOENIW, A,,  AND K. SHELL  (1997): "Robustness of Sunspot Equilibria," Ecorzomic Theory, 10,79-98. 
GUL,  F., AND  A. POSTLEWAITE  (1992): "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large  Exchange Economies with 
Asymmetric Information," Economettica, 60, 1273-1292. 
HART,  S. (1974): "Formation of  Cartels in Large Markets," Jo~lrnal  of Ecorzonzic Theory, 7, 453-466. 
HART,  S., AND A. MAS-COLELL (1996): "Harsanyi  Values of  Large Economies: Non-Equivalence  to 
Competitive Equilibria,"  Games and Ecotzonzic Belzauior, 13, 74-99. 
HOLMSTROM,  (1983): "Efficient  and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete  B., AND R. MYERSON 
Information," Econometrzca, 51, 1799-1819. 
ICHIISHI, T., AND A. IDZIIC  (1996): "Bayesian Cooperative Choice of  Strategies," Itzternatiotzal Journal 
of  Game Theory, 25, 455-473. 
KOBAYASHI, T. (1980): "Equilibrium  Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information," Ecorzo-
metncn, 48, 1635-1665. 
LEE, D. (1998): "Essays on the Core of  an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Ph.D. Thesis, 
Brown University. 
LEE, D.,  AND 0.  VOLIJ  (1997): "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: an Axiomatic 
Approach,"  forthcoming in  Jozlrnal of Mathematical Economics. 
MANELLI, A. (1991): "Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence,"  Econometncn, 59, 123-138. 
MCLEAN,  R., AND  A.  POSTLEWAITE  "Informational  Size  and  Incentive  Compatibility," (1999): 
Mimeo, University of  Pennsylvania. 
POSTLEWAITE, A,, AND  D.  (1986):  "Implementation  in  Differential SCHMEIDLER  Information 
Economies,"  Journal of Ecotzomic Theory, 39, 14-33. 
PRESCOTT, E., AND R. TOWNSEND  (1984): "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse 
Selection and Moral Hazard," Econornetrica, 52, 21-45. 
RADNER, R. (1968): "Competitive Equilibrium under Uncertainty," Econornetrica, 36, 31-58. 
VOHRA,  R. (1999): "Incomplete  Information,  Incentive  Compatibility  and  the  Core,"  Jolrrnal  of 
Ecorzomic Tlzeoty, 86, 123-147. 
VOLIJ,  0.  (2000):  L'Communication,  Credible  Improvements and  the  Core  of  an  Economy  with 
Asymmetric Information," Irztemational Journal of  Game Theory, 29, 63-79. 
WILSON, R. (1978): "Information,  Efficiency  and  the  Core  of  an  Economy,"  Econornetrica, 46, 
807-816. 
YANNELIS, N. (1991): "The Core of  an Economy with Differential Information," Ecotzonzic Theory, 1, 
183-198. You have printed the following article:
On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information
Roberto Serrano; Rajiv Vohra; Oscar Volij
Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 6. (Nov., 2001), pp. 1685-1696.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28200111%2969%3A6%3C1685%3AOTFOCC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5
This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an
off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please
visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.
[Footnotes]
2Edgeworth's Conjecture with Infinitely many Commodities: L^1
Robert M. Anderson; William R. Zame
Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 2. (Mar., 1997), pp. 225-273.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199703%2965%3A2%3C225%3AECWIMC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y
2Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
Robert M. Anderson; Walter Trockel; Lin Zhou
Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 5. (Sep., 1997), pp. 1227-1239.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199709%2965%3A5%3C1227%3ANOTMAZ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B
2Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence
Alejandro M. Manelli
Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Jan., 1991), pp. 123-138.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199101%2959%3A1%3C123%3AMPACE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
3Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information
Takao Kobayashi





- Page 1 of 3 -
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.References
Edgeworth's Conjecture with Infinitely many Commodities: L^1
Robert M. Anderson; William R. Zame
Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 2. (Mar., 1997), pp. 225-273.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199703%2965%3A2%3C225%3AECWIMC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
Robert M. Anderson; Walter Trockel; Lin Zhou
Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 5. (Sep., 1997), pp. 1227-1239.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199709%2965%3A5%3C1227%3ANOTMAZ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B
Markets with a Continuum of Traders
Robert J. Aumann




David Cass; Karl Shell
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 2. (Apr., 1983), pp. 193-227.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198304%2991%3A2%3C193%3ADSM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
Faruk Gul; Andrew Postlewaite





- Page 2 of 3 -
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
Bengt Holmström; Roger B. Myerson
Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 6. (Nov., 1983), pp. 1799-1819.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198311%2951%3A6%3C1799%3AEADDRW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H
Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information
Takao Kobayashi
Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 7. (Nov., 1980), pp. 1635-1665.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198011%2948%3A7%3C1635%3AECFSWD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J
Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence
Alejandro M. Manelli
Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Jan., 1991), pp. 123-138.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199101%2959%3A1%3C123%3AMPACE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Edward C. Prescott; Robert M. Townsend
Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Jan., 1984), pp. 21-46.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198401%2952%3A1%3C21%3APOACEW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23
Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty
Roy Radner
Econometrica, Vol. 36, No. 1. (Jan., 1968), pp. 31-58.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28196801%2936%3A1%3C31%3ACEUU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
Robert Wilson





- Page 3 of 3 -
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.